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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical discussion of the forward premium
anomaly. We reformulate the well-known Lucas (1982) model by allowing
for the existence of monetary policy regimes. The monetary supply is
viewed as having two stochastic components: a) a persistent component
that reﬂects the preferences of the central bank regarding the long-run
money supply or inﬂation target, and b) a transitory component that rep-
resents short-lived interventions. To generate agents’ forecasts, we con-
sider two scenarios: a) consumers can distinguish the permanent and the
transitory components of the money supply (complete information), and
b) consumers face a signal-extraction problem to disentangle permanent
and transitory components of the money supply (incomplete information).
We simulate the model from a careful estimate of the parameters involved
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in the model. Numerical simulations reveal that, under complete informa-
tion, forward unbiasedness cannot be rejected at conventionally signiﬁcant
levels. However, when learning about monetary policy is incorporated, the
forward bias can be reproduced without artiﬁcially assuming an unreason-
able degree of risk aversion.
Key words: monetary policy, regime shifts, learning, forward bias.
JEL classiﬁcation: E43;F31;G14.
1 Introduction
Under risk neutrality and rational expectations, the forward exchange rate
should be and unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. However, there is
overwhelming empirical evidence in the literature rejecting the unbiasedness
hypothesis (see, for example, the survey of Engel (1996)). Not only is a down-
ward bias detected, the diﬀerence between the forward and spot exchange is
also negatively correlated with future changes in spot rates, a pattern known
as the forward premium puzzle. From the perspective of dynamic general equi-
librium theory, although a substantial number of studies have addressed the
ability of general equilibrium models building on Lucas (1982), to explain the
forward premium puzzle they either require unreasonable risk aversion para-
meters or incredibly volatile consumption processes, even introducing external
habit preferences over consumption. The recent work by Verdelhan (2010) pro-
vides additional insights using the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) approach
but assuming that risk-free rates are low when consumption is close to the
habit level. The model reproduces the uncovered interest parity (UIP) puzzle,
but considers exogenous consumption processes, and its major concern is that
simulated exchange rates are too volatile and too closely linked to consumption
growth shocks.
This paper proposes a minor revision of the Lucas model that accounts for
persistent deviations from the UIP condition. Our work is similar in spirit to
Backus et el. (2010), but instead of abandoning explicit models of money in
favor of interest rate rules, we model money supply exploiting the role of regime
changes in ﬁnancial markets1 . The basic aspect is to reproduce the idea that
exchange rates are characterized not only by highly persistent trends but also
by abrupt changes arising infrequently2 . While other papers try to explain
the forward bias and the forward premium anomaly through habit persistence,
recursive preferences and negative shocks to consumption growth, our attempt
does not incorporate such aspects in order to assess the role of learning about
monetary policy as a factor explaining the forward bias.
The monetary policy is speciﬁed as having two components (Andolfatto et
al. 2004): one is determined in each time period by the prevailing monetary
regime and reﬂects a particular target of the central bank regarding the money
1See Ang and Timmermann (2011), for a recent review of regime switching applications in
ﬁnance.
2Baillie and Chang (2011) use a logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR) model and
found that UIP is more likely to hold in a regime where volatility is unusually high.
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supply or inﬂation; the second represents short-lived interventions. Therefore
our model departs from the Lucas model principally in that individuals can
observe the historical sequence of money supply, but they cannot distinguish
whether a monetary shock implies a regime shift or a transitory intervention.
Economic agents consequently face a signal-extraction problem through a learn-
ing mechanism that allows monetary shocks to be broken down into estimated
transitory and permanent components.3
Our main result is that when agents are capable of anticipating monetary
policy shifts, that is, when they can exactly identify the transitory and persistent
components of monetary disturbances, the forward unbiasedness hypothesis can-
not be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels. However, when agents need
to solve a nontrivial signal extraction problem on the basis of the past history
of monetary policy, a signiﬁcant downward forward bias systematically appears.
Also, as expected, high risk aversion intensiﬁes the downward bias.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the theoretical model, while Section 3 describes how expectations are computed
with complete and incomplete information. Section 4 discusses the implications
of the model using estimated parameters from US and the EMU. Finally, Section
5 summarizes and provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Our modelling strategy is to extend the well-known Lucas (1982) model by
allowing for the existence of regime changes in monetary policy. We will consider
two scenarios: in the ﬁrst one, structural parameters concerning the evolution of
money supply over time are assumed to be known. By contrast, we also consider
the more realistic case in which agents need to learn from current history in order
to forecast future monetary policy. We start by presenting our version of Lucas’
model and describing the assumed structure for monetary policy.
Let Xt and X∗t denote the exogenous endowments of consumption goods
in the domestic and foreign countries. Endowments are stochastic, and their
natural logarithm follows an autoregressive process with normal innovations:
Xt = µXtXt−1, (1)
X∗t = µX∗tX
∗
t−1, (2)
where:
3As Krugman (2007) said: "But Friedman never went there. His reality sense warned
that [rational expectations] was taking the idea of Homo economicus too far". Chakraborty
and Evans (2008) suggests that the learning theory approach to expectation formation in the
foreign exchange markets should be considered a serious contender in future empirical work on
the forward-premium puzzle. See also the recent works of Ilut (2010), Gourio et al. (2011) and
Burnside et al. (2011) as representative recent papers that try to exploit the idea of learning
about unobserved regimes in order to explain the forward premium anomaly. As to the role of
monetary policy, Mark and Mohb (2007) propose a model where the forward premium anomaly
is caused by unanticipated central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market.
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
∇ lnXt − ln µ¯X
∇ lnX∗t − ln µ¯X∗

=

ρ11 ρ12
ρ21 ρ22

∇ lnXt−1 − ln µ¯X
∇ lnX∗t−1 − ln µ¯X∗

+

ξX,t
ξX∗,t

,
(3)
where,

ξX,t
ξX∗,t

∼ N

02×1,

σ2ξX,t
σξX,tξX∗,t
σ2ξX∗,t

.
This way, similarly to Lafuente and Ruiz (2006), the potential correlation
between real shocks in the domestic and foreign countries is explicitly taken into
account. Let ρξX ,ξX∗denote the linear correlation coeﬃcient between these two
shocks.
2.1 The consumer’s problem
The optimization problem for the home consumer is:
Max E0
∞
t=0
βt
1
1− γ

[φ (CD,t)
ǫ + (1− φ) (CF,t)
ǫ]
(1−γ)/ǫ
− 1

(4)
{CD,t , CF,t}
s.t.
PD,tCD,t + StPF,tCF,t ≤ Yt,
Yt =Mt + Tt−1
St − Ft−1
Ft−1
,
where CD,t and CF,t are the consumption levels of domestic and foreign goods
at time t , γ > 0 is the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, 11−ǫ is the elasticity
of substitution with ǫ < 1, while parameter φ ∈ (0, 1) represents the weight of
each consumption good in the utility function4 . As for the budget constraint,
PD,t and PF,t denote the prices of domestic and foreign goods at time t, Yt is
the total income in period t, St is the spot exchange rate, Ft−1 is the price of
forward contract, Tt−1 is the respective amount of its currency that the home
country sold forward in the previous period. The money supply (Mt) plus the
proﬁts on each forward currency trade in period t equals total home income. A
similar optimization problem is solved by the foreign consumer:
Max E0
∞
t=0
βt
1
1− γ

φ
	
C∗D,t

ǫ
+ (1− φ)
	
C∗F,t

ǫ(1−γ)/ǫ
− 1

(5)
{C∗D,t , C
∗
F,t}
s.t.
4The eﬀect on the foreign exchange from shocks to equations (1) and (2) could depend
on the type of preferences of the representative agent. The asset pricing literature shows
that time-additive utility as in the paper generates counterfactual results, increasing asset
prices when expected growth decreases. The inclusion of recursive preference resolves this
issue (Bansal and Yaron, 2004) and could improve the ability of the model to reproduce the
forward bias.
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PD,tC
∗
D,t + StPF,tC
∗
F,t ≤ Y
∗
t St,
Y ∗t =M
∗
t + T
∗
t−1
St − Ft−1
Ft−1St
.
2.2 Optimum good choices.
In any period t the home consumer chooses levels of CD,t and CF,t that solves
(4). First order conditions for choice of CD,t and CF,t are:
[φ (CD,t)
ǫ + (1− φ) (CF,t)
ǫ]
1−γ
ǫ
−1
(CD,t)
ǫ−1 − λtPD,t = 0, (6)
[φ (CD,t)
ǫ
+ (1− φ) (CF,t)
ǫ
]
1−γ
ǫ
−1
(CF,t)
ǫ−1
− λtStPF,t = 0, (7)
Yt − PD,tCD,t − PF,tStCF,t = 0, (8)
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier. From equations (6) and (7), we
obtain:
CF,t =

(1− φ)PD,t
φPF,tSt
σ
CD,t, (9)
where σ = 11−ǫ denotes the elasticity of substitution. Using (8) and the budget
constraint, the demand function for the domestic and foreign good is as follows:
CD,t =
YtP
−σ
D,t
P 1−σD,t +

1−φ
φ
σ
(StPF,t)
1−σ
, (10)
CF,t =

(1− φ)PD,t
φPF,tSt
σ YtP−σD,t
P 1−σD,t +

1−φ
φ
σ
(StPF,t)
1−σ
. (11)
Using a similar procedure, the demands for the foreign country can be found,
that is:
C∗F,t =

(1− φ)PD,t
φPF,tSt
σ
C∗D,t, (12)
C∗D,t =
Y ∗t StP
−σ
D,t
P 1−σD,t +

1−φ
φ
σ
(StPF,t)
1−σ
, (13)
C∗F,t =

(1− φ)PD,t
φPF,tSt
σ Y ∗t StP−σD,t
P 1−σD,t +

1−φ
φ
σ
(StPF,t)
1−σ
. (14)
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2.3 Forward Contracting
As well as the allocation of current resources between the two goods, the home
consumer chooses the level of forward contracting in period t. The Euler con-
dition is:
Et

λt+1β
t+1

St+1 − Ft
Ft

= 0 (15)
where Et denotes the conditional expectation based on the information set avail-
able in period t. From (15):
Et [λt+1St+1] = FtEtλt+1
and taking into account (6), the value of the forward exchange rate at time t
consistent with the consumer’s optimal choice is:
Ft =
Et

∂Ut+1
∂CF,t+1
1
PF,t+1

Et

∂Ut+1
∂CF,t+1
1
PF,t+1St+1
 . (16)
A similar expression applies for the foreign country:
Ft =
Et

∂U∗t+1
∂C∗
F,t+1
1
PF,t+1

Et

∂U∗t+1
∂C∗
F,t+1
1
PF,t+1St+1
 . (17)
2.4 Equilibrium in the Goods Market
In equilibrium, the total endowment of the two goods must be equal to the
consumption of each good in the two countries, that is:
CD,t +C
∗
D,t = XD,t, (18)
CF,t +C
∗
F,t = XF,t. (19)
Equilibrium prices of the two goods depend on the home and foreign money
supplies as well as on their endowment. Taking into account that a) money is
worthless after each period and b) each country’s good can only be purchased
with that country’s currency, the following cash-in-advance spending constraints
must hold:
PD,tXD,t =Mt, (20)
PF,tXF,t =M
∗
t . (21)
Also, in equilibrium, the following relationship between home and foreign deriv-
ative positions holds:
Tt = −T
∗
t .
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2.5 Monetary policy
Following Andolfatto et al. (2004), we assume that the money supply at the
beginning of period t comprises two stochastic components: one component
which reﬂects the main regime which is determined by the long-run monetary
policy target, and the second component being the short-run error made in
control of monetary aggregates by the central bank. For the home country, we
have:
Mt = µMtMt−1, with lnµMt = ln µ¯M + zt + ut,
whereMt denotes the home money supply, µ is the average rate of growth of the
natural logarithm of the money supply, and zt and ut and denote the regime and
transitory component, respectively. We also assume that the regime component
of the monetary policy to remain constant for a relatively long time period and
a new regime appears only occasionally. Thus, the time evolution of zt can be
expressed as follows:
zt =

zt−1, with probability p
gt, with probability 1− p, where gt ∼ N
	
0, σ2g


.
Parameter p reﬂects the expected duration of any given regime, or alter-
natively, the persistence of the regime. While a shift in the regime variable
zt can be given a number of interpretations, it could correspond to changes in
preferences of monetary authorities for the proper long-term rate of monetary
expansion. Alternatively, it could be also interpreted as the appointment of
a new central bank governor, whose preferences over inﬂation outcomes diﬀer
from those of their predecessor (Andolfatto et al., 2004). Given that zt could
be interpreted as the long-run monetary guidelines of the central bank, it is
expected that such persistence would be fairly high. Parameter σ2g reﬂects the
potential size of the regime shift. The transitory money growth component of
the ut is assumed to follow a standard AR(1) speciﬁcation:
ut = δut−1 + at,
with 0 < δ ≪ 1 and at ∼ N
	
0, σ2a


. The variable ut can be interpreted as the
outcome of a monetary intervention in ﬁnancial markets as a reaction to shocks
occurring in the world economy. In a similar way, the dynamics of the monetary
policy of the foreign country is described as follows:
M∗t = µM∗t M
∗
t−1, with lnµM∗t = ln µ¯M∗ + z
∗
t + u
∗
t ,
z∗t =

z∗t−1, with probability p
∗
g∗t , with probability 1− p
∗, where g∗t ∼ N
	
0, σ2g∗


.
u∗t = δ
∗u∗t−1 + a
∗
t , 0 < δ ≪ 1, at ∼ N
	
0, σ2a∗


Domestic and foreign monetary shocks on the transitory component ( at and
a∗t ) may be correlated, with correlation coeﬃcient ρaa∗ .
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2.6 Spot exchange rates
Using the budget constraints and equations (18) to (21), the analytical expres-
sion of the equilibrium spot rate is:
St =
1− φ
φ

XF,t
XD,t
ε
Mt
M∗t
. (22)
3 Computing expectations and estimating para-
meters
To obtain simulated equilibrium time series for spot and forward exchange rates,
there are two aspects of prior work that we need to deal with: a) the comput-
ing of expectations, and b).the estimation of parameter values related to our
monetary policy speciﬁcation.
3.1 Expectations under complete and incomplete infor-
mation
Since we are trying to asses whether learning is an explaining factor for the
forward bias in our model, we consider two frameworks for generating expecta-
tions concerning monetary policy. Firstly, let us assume that consumers in the
economy know the structural parameters. From now on we will refer this case
as "complete information". In this case, consumers are perfectly able to distin-
guish the transitory and persistent components of money supply. For example,
in the home country agents forecast the future money supply according to the
following expression:
Et

ln

Mt+1
Mt

− ln µ¯M

= Et (zt+1 + ut+1) = pzt + δut.
In the more realistic case of incomplete information, consumers are unable
to determine exactly which policy regime applies at any given time, that is, they
do not know how to break down historical realizations of money supply into per-
manent and transitory drivers. This implies that agents need to solve a signal
extraction problem which determines how agents learn using the new informa-
tion that arrives at the market to estimate any regime changes in monetary
policy.
To compute expectations of zt+1 and ut+1 conditional to the information
set available at time t under incomplete information economic agents, that act
as econometricians, use a state-space representation for the growth rate of the
money supply mentioned above in a similar way as in Andolfatto et al. (2004).
For example, in the case of the domestic country:
yt+1 = H
′
ξt+1
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ξt+1 = Fξt + υ˜t+1
where:
yt+1 = ln

Mt+1
Mt

− ln µ¯M ,
ξt = (zt, ut)´ ,
υ˜t = (Nt, at), where Nt =

(1− p) zt, with probability p
gt, with probability 1− p
F =

p 0
0 δ

,
H
′
= (1, 1).
However, the use of the Kalman ﬁlter for the foregoing state-space represen-
tation is non-optimal because the noise vector υ˜t is not Gaussian. To overcome
the absence of normality we use an alternative state-space representation that is
equivalent in mean and variance to the representation considered in Andolfatto
et al. (2004)5 . For example, for the domestic country we have:
yt+1 = H
′
ξt+1 ((23))
ξt+1 = Fξt +GRt+1Etξt+1 +ΦRt+1υt+1 ((24))
where:
yt+1 = ln

Mt+1
Mt

− ln µ¯M ,
ξt = (zt, ut)´ ,
υt+1 = (gt+1, at+1),
F =

ϕ 0
0 δ

, |ϕ| ∈ (0, 1)
H
′
= (1, 1)
GSt+1 =

ωRt+1 0
0 0

, ωSt+1 =

1−ϕ
p , if Rt+1 = 1,with probability p
−ϕ
p , if Rt+1 = 0,with probability 1− p
,
ΦSt+1 =

δRt+1 0
0 1

, δSt+1 =

0, if Rt+1 = 1,with probability p
1, if Rt+1 = 0,with probability 1− p
,
where Rt+1 = 1 reﬂects no regime shift, that is, no change for the current
monetary policy target. On the contrary Rt+1 = 0 corresponds to the case of
changes in the policy target. Now the state equation requires the use of state-
contingent matrices, and explicitly incorporates the role of economic agents’
expectations in learning about monetary policy-making.
Our state-space representation is observationally equivalent to the speciﬁca-
tion considered in Andolfatto et al. (2004) from the perspective of conditional
mean and yields the same conditional variance if ϕ = 1− p2 . The proof of such
statements can be found in Lafuente et al. (2011). Additionally, our represen-
tation has the advantage of having Gaussian innovations for the state equation,
5A detailed explanation of this alternative representation can be found in Lafuente et al.
(2011).
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and therefore the Kalman ﬁlter becomes an optimal signal extraction procedure
to disentangle yˆt+1|t as the sum of zˆt+1|t and uˆt+1|t.
3.2 Maximum likelihood estimation of parameters for mon-
etary policy
Interestingly enough, this representation allows us not only the optimal use of
the Kalman ﬁlter as the signal extraction procedure to obtain yˆt+1|t, but also to
perform the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters involved in the
monetary policy.
To obtain the log-likelihood function in the case of the domestic country,
ﬁrst we compute the conditional density of yt to Yt−1 ≡ (y1, y2, ..., yt−1)
′
and
Rt:
f (yt| Yt−1, Rt; Θ) = (2π)
−1
2
Ω(k)t − 12 exp−12 µˆ(k)′t Ω(k)t −1 µˆ(k)t

,
where Ω
(k)
t = H
′P
(k)
t|t−1H, µˆ
(k)
t = yt −H
′ξˆ
(k)
t|t−1, Θ = (δ, p, σg, σa)
′
, k = 0, 1 de-
notes the two alternative contingent states, and P
(k)
t|t−1 = E

ξt − ξˆ
(k)
t|t−1

ξt − ξˆ
(k)
t|t−1
′
.
Second, we compute the marginal density function of yt conditional to Yt−1
as follows:
f (yt| Yt−1;Θ) =
1
k=0
f (yt| Yt−1, Rt = k; Θ)× Pr [Rt = k] .
Finally, we obtain the parameters contained in Θ by solving the following
optimization problem:
Max
Θ
lnL (Θ)⇔ Max
Θ
T
t=1
ln [f (yt| Yt−1; Θ)] .
A similar problem applies to the foreign country in estimatingΘ∗ = (δ∗, p∗, σg∗ , σa∗).
4 Numerical results
Table 1 summarizes the point estimates (standard deviations are in brackets)
for all the relevant parameters involved in the monetary policy based on the
maximum likelihood estimation procedure using the state-space representation
that we mentioned at the end of the previous section. We used quarterly data
of M2 for the US and the EMU covering the sample period from 1980:Q1 to
2011:Q1 and 1991:Q1 to 2011Q1, respectively. In our model the price of do-
mestic and foreign goods, as well as the spot and forward exchange rates are
endogenously determined, and therefore, we focus on the two largest economies
in terms of nominal GDP to estimate monetary policy rule parameters.
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Once the transitory components are estimated, we can compute the cor-
relation between the domestic and the foreign innovation that appear in the
autoregressive processes concerning the persistent components of the monetary
policy. In particular we obtain ρaa∗ = 0.3188.
Given that we are going to simulate quarterly data, we consider a discount
factor of 0.99, a commonly used value in the real business cycle literature. As
to the weight of each consumption good in the utility function we set φ = 0.5.
Given that we have no habit formation we initially depart from Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) by setting a risk aversion parameter γ = 4. We also use time
series data to estimate the parameters involved in real endowment evolution
over time. Using the common sample (1991:Q1 to 2011Q1), the estimation of
the bivariate VAR for the growth rate of GDP leads to the following point
estimates:

∇ lnXt − ln µ¯X
∇ lnX∗t − ln µ¯X∗

=

0.5258 −0.0521
0.2883 0.3883

∇ lnXt−1 − ln µ¯X
∇ lnX∗t−1 − ln µ¯X∗

+

ξˆX,t
ξˆX∗,t

(23)
with µ¯X = 1.0063, µ¯X∗ = 1.0040, σξˆX,t = .0060, σξˆX∗,t = .0059 and the cor-
relation between the home and foreign real shocks ρξX ,ξX∗ = 0.1742. Table 2
shows the baseline parameterization that we consider. We simulated the model
1,000 times generating observations for each time series with the same sample
size of the largest dataset used in the estimation. Economic agents need to
solve a signal-extraction problem for estimating the two individual components
of the money supply. We assume that they face this problem by construct-
ing an optimal forecast based on all the relevant information. Each simulation
is performed under two scenarios: complete and incomplete information. The
complete information scenario corresponds to the case when agents can perfectly
identify permanent and transitory components of monetary policy. In contrast,
under incomplete information, agents face a nontrivial signal extraction problem
because they can observe only aggregated noise.
Solving the model requires the evaluation of highly non-linear expressions,
precluding the possibility of an analytical solution. Appendix 1 provides a de-
tailed explanation of the solution method proposed to obtain simulated equilib-
rium time series for spot and forward exchange rates. It should be highlighted
that the simulation of the model economy under incomplete information requires
the use of the Kalman ﬁlter to compute expectations for zt and ut as previously
described in Section 3.
To test the unbiasedness of the forward exchange rate as a forecast of the
future spot rate, following Fama (1984), the econometric speciﬁcation most
commonly used in the literature is the following:
st+k − st = α+ β (ft+k − st) + ξt+k
where st+k is the log of the nominal exchange rate in time t+ k, ft+k is the log
of the k-period forward rate traded at time t and ξt+k is a random error.
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To clearly identify the ability of the model to reproduce the forward bias we
not only present the median estimate and the conﬁdence interval at the 10%
signiﬁcance level, but also the density functions of the estimated slopes with
the 1,000 regressions for each scenario (complete and incomplete information).
Figure 1 summarizes the results obtained from the baseline parameterization. It
can be observed that the existence of learning clearly produces a downward bias
in the estimated slope coeﬃcient. On the contrary, under rational expectations
the estimated slope is close to one. Indeed we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of β = 1 against the alternative β < 1 at the 10% signiﬁcance level. However,
under incomplete information the null is rejected.
The hypothesis of rational expectations would require that market partici-
pants be homogeneous in their formation of expectations. But this assumption
implicitly assumes that agents do not make systematic errors when forecasting
the relevant variables and parameters (for example the probability of regime
shift). However neither complete information nor perfect foresight are features
of ﬁnancial markets. In order to give a better understanding of the economics
of the underlying mechanism that leads to the forward bias, Figure 2 shows the
price adjustment process under rational expectations and bounded rationality
using the baseline parameterization. For a given realization of the stochastic
component zt (the domestic persistent component of the monetary policy), the
graph depicts the equilibrium spot rate as well as the corresponding equilibrium
forward rates under complete and incomplete information. As expected, agents
are slower to update their expectations of forward prices under incomplete infor-
mation. As a consequence of these sticky expectations, during the transitional
dynamics that takes place after the arising of a monetary shift, spot and forward
prices could show a transitory negative correlation (see, for example, the time
evolution around time periods 17 and 22). Remember that the OLS estimator
for the slope in the Fama regression can be expressed as follows:
βˆOLS = β

1 +
Cov
	
ft+k − st, ξt+k


V ar (ft+k − st)

and, therefore, the point estimate is below 1 under the null of β = 1 (ratio-
nal expectations) when spot and forward prices are negatively correlated. In
sum, what the model shows is that, given that learning is time-consuming, the
price discovery role of the forward market is not as expected under rational
expectations.
To analyze the sensitivity of our results we also present numerical simulations
by changing some parameters from the benchmark setting. In particular, we
check the robustness of our results to changes in the curvature of the utility
function (parameter γ) and the degree of substitutability (parameter ǫ).
Figure 3 presents the results with lower risk aversion, in particular for
γ = 1.5. As is apparent, the nature of our results from the baseline para-
meterization remains qualitatively unchanged. As expected, the downward bias
is now smaller. When risk aversion is lower the impact of consumption shocks
on the change in marginal utility is smaller. Under such conditions agents pre-
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fer less persistent consumption, which leads to lower persistence in the forward
premium and a shorter time period with negative correlations between spot and
forward prices during the transitional dynamics.
Figure 4 shows the results with ǫ = 0.5, that is, considering a higher degree of
substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Again, the distribution of the
slope coeﬃcient under complete information departs from the one corresponding
to the case of incomplete information. Similarly to the baseline scenario, the
null hypothesis of β = 1 against the alternative of β < 1 cannot be rejected at
the 10% signiﬁcance level under complete information. However, it is rejected
when learning takes place. The intuition is that a higher degree of substitution
tends to produce a more asymmetric consumption basket, and when the relative
weight of the foreign good is relatively more important the exposure to exchange
risk increases dramatically. As a consequence, the forward discount becomes
more persistent and the downward bias increases.
To reinforce the idea that learning about monetary policy plays a key role
we ﬁnally simulate the model with a new scenario where uncertainty about
monetary policy making is clearly higher in the domestic country (i.e. higher
probability of regime shift and higher volatility for the persistent and transitory
shocks). The rest of the parameters in both countries take benchmark values.
Figure 5 shows the results. Compared with the baseline scenario, the downward
bias in the slope coeﬃcient tends to increase. When monetary policy is imple-
mented in a non-similar way, learning about shifts is harder, and the updating
process for expectations is much slower. This result is consistent with those re-
ported in Sakoulis et al. (2010), who ﬁnd that structural breaks in the forward
discount process as a consequence of changes in monetary policy objectives of
the central banks of diﬀerent countries lead to a signiﬁcant downward bias for
the forward discount coeﬃcient in the Fama regression.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has explored an explanation for the forward bias in foreign exchange
markets based on a stochastic and dynamic general equilibrium model that in-
corporates regime shifts in monetary policy. Based on the well-known Lucas’
model, its main innovation lies in the existence of a representative agent that
needs to estimate the current state of monetary policy from analyzing the past
history. The money supply is viewed as having two stochastic components: a) a
persistent component that reﬂects the preferences of the central bank regarding
the long-run money supply or inﬂation target, and b) a transitory component
that represents short-lived interventions or errors in controlling the money sup-
ply. In addition, the model is formulated to allow for diﬀerent weights for each
consumption good in the utility function and the possibility that home and for-
eign real shocks as well as transitory monetary shocks in the two countries may
be correlated.
We present results from numerical simulations focusing on the role of mon-
etary policy. In particular, we consider two scenarios: a) complete information,
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with consumers that can perfectly distinguish the transitory and persistent com-
ponents of money supply, and b) incomplete information, where consumers are
unable to perfectly determine which policy regime applies at any given time,
and face a signal-extraction problem.
We simulated the model initially using a baseline parameterization which
is based on a careful estimation from quarterly data for the US and the EU.
Numerical simulations suggest that the need for learning is a factor explaining
the forward bias. While under incomplete information the forward discount still
points in the right direction, a signiﬁcant downward bias arises in comparison
with the scenario of complete information, where the null hypothesis of unitary
slope cannot be rejected at conventional signiﬁcant levels. A combination of our
monetary uncertainty with habit persistence could reproduce the anomaly. We
left this issue for further research.
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6 Appendix 1
This appendix contains the explanation of the solution method used. From the
optimality conditions, we obtain the following set of equations:
St =
1− φ
φ

XF,t
XD,t
ε
Mt
M∗t
(A1)
PD,t =
Mt
XD,t
(A2)
PF,t =
M∗t
XF,t
(A3)
CF,t =

(1− φ)PD,t
φPF,tSt
σ
CD,t (A4)
C∗F,t =

(1− φ)PD,t
φPF,tSt
σ
C∗D,t (A5)
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P 1−σD,t +
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1−φ
φ
σ
(StPF,t)
1−σ
(A6)
C∗F,t =

(1− φ)PD,t
φPF,tSt
σ M∗t + T ∗t−1 St−Ft−1Ft−q StP−σD,t
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
1−φ
φ
σ
(StPF,t)
1−σ
(A7)
T ∗t−1 = Tt−1 (A8)
Ft =
Et

Cǫ−1D,t+1
	
φCǫD,t+1 + (1− φ)C
ǫ
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 1−γ
ǫ
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Et
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Ft =
Et
	
C∗F,t+1

ǫ−1 	
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ǫ
+ (1− φ)
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ǫ
 1−γǫ −1 1
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ǫ
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St+1PF,t+1

(A10)
Using equations (A1) to (A8), equations (A9) and (A10) can be expressed
as follows:
Ft =
Et

g1
	
Ft,Mt;Mt+1,M
∗
t+1,XD,t+1,XF,t+1


Et

g2
	
Ft,Mt;Mt+1,M∗t+1,XD,t+1,XF,t+1

 (A11)
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where functions gi (·) , i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are:
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−γ
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We use linear and log-linear approximation of functions gi (·) , i = 1, 2, 3, 4
around the estimated trend using the Hoddrick-Prescott ﬁlter forXD,t+1,XF,t+1,
Mt+1 and M
∗
t+1. Substituting such approximant functions into equations (A11)
and (A12), we obtain a system of two equations with two variables (Ft, Tt)
as a function of the following expectations: Et

ln

µXt+1

, Et

ln

µX∗t+1

,
Et

ln

µMt+1

, Et

lnµM∗t+1

. Expectations for endowments are always com-
puted as Et

ln

µXt+1

= (1− ρX) ln (µ¯X) + ρ11 ln
	
µXt


+ ρ12 ln

µX∗t

and
Et

ln

µX∗t+1

= (1− ρX∗) ln (µ¯X∗) + ρ21 ln
	
µXt


+ ρ22 ln

µX∗t

for the do-
mestic and the foreign country, respectively. However, for the monetary policy
we consider two alternative scenarios:
a) Complete information: in this case, expectations are computed as follows:
Et

ln

µMt+1

= ln µ¯M+pzt+δut, and Et

ln

µM∗t+1

= ln µ¯M∗+p
∗z∗t+
δ∗u∗t
b) Incomplete information:
Et

ln

µMt+1

− ln µ¯M

= yˆt+1|t = zˆt+1|t+uˆt+1|t, andEt

ln

µM∗t+1

− ln µ¯M∗

=
yˆ∗t+1|t = zˆ
∗
t+1|t + uˆ
∗
t+1|t by applying the Kalman ﬁlter using equations (23) and
(24).
Once the relevant expectations have been computed either under complete
or incomplete information, the above system for (Ft, Tt) can be solved.
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Appendix 2
Table 1. Point estimates for persistent and transitory components of the mon-
etary policy
US p = .8695[.0674] δ = .6103[0.0517] σ2g = .0128[0.0058] σ
2
a = .0048[0.0002]
EMU p∗ = .8528[0.0056] δ∗ = .7902[0.0647] σ2g∗ = .0104[0.0044] σ
2
a∗ = .0038[0.0001]
Table 2. Baseline parameterization
Home country (US) Foreign country (EMU)
ρ11 0.5258 ρ22 0.3883
ρ12 −0.0521 ρ21 0.2883
µ¯X 1.0063 µ¯X∗ 1.0040
σX 0.0060 σX∗ 0.0059
σg 0.0128 σg∗ 0.0104
σa 0.0048 σa∗ 0.0038
δ 0.6103 δ∗ 0.7902
Correlations: ρξX ,ξX∗ = 0.1742; ρaa∗ = 0.4243
Parameter to control the elasticity of substitution: ǫ = −1
Discount factor: β = 0.99
Weight of each consumption good in the utility function: φ = 0.50
Curvature of the utility function: γ = 4.0
Probability of regime shifts: 1− p = 1− 0.8695; 1− p∗ = 1− 0.8528
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Figure 1. Density functions of simulated slopes. Baseline parameterization
Note: the dotted line corresponds to complete information
Median slope
Complete information Incomplete information
0.6636 0.4735
90-th quantile
Complete information Incomplete information
1.1408 0.9057
th-quantile that corresponds to the unitary value
Complete information Incomplete information
82% 93%
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Figure 2 Adjustment of forward rates under rational expectations and bounded
rationality
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Figure 3. Density functions of simulated slopes. Sensitivity to parameter γ
(γ = 1.5)
Note: the dotted line corresponds to complete information
Median slope
Complete information Incomplete information
0.8928 0.6339
90-th quantile
Complete information Incomplete information
1.2966 0.9717
th-quantile that corresponds to the unitary value
Complete information Incomplete information
63% 90%
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Figure 4. Density functions of simulated slopes. Sensitivity to parameter ǫ
(ǫ = 0.5)
Note: the dotted line corresponds to complete information
Median slope
Complete information Incomplete information
0.5280 0.2928
90-th quantile
Complete information Incomplete information
1.0225 0.7499
th-quantile that corresponds to the unitary value
Complete information Incomplete information
91% 98%
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Figure 5. Density functions of simulated slopes. New baseline parameteri-
zation
Note: the dotted line corresponds to complete information
Median slope
Complete information Incomplete information
0.5005 0.3458
90-th quantile
Complete information Incomplete information
1.0929 0.8017
th-quantile that corresponds to the unitary value
Complete information Incomplete information
86% 96%
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